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We document a negative trend in the leisure of men married to women
aged 25-45, relative to that of their wives, and a positive trend in rel-
ative housework. Taken together, these trends rule out a popular class
of labor supply models in which unitary households maximize the sum of
the spouse￿ s utility. We develop a simple bargaining model of marriage,
divorce and allocations of leisure-time and housework. According to the
model, a rise in women￿ s relative wage will reduce husband￿ s leisure and
marriage rates when the quality of single life is relatively high for women.
Calibration to US data shows the trend in relative wages explains most of
the trend in relative leisure and about a third of the trend in housework,
while the simultaneous trend in home-durables prices explains the balance
of the housework trend..
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11 Introduction
Over the last 35 years, the average weekly time married women spend in paid
employment has doubled. Two plausible explanations of this change are that
women￿ s wages have increased relative to those of men, and that rising produc-
tivity in household work has allowed married women to devote more time to
market work. A host of recent papers explore one or both of these hypotheses;
these include Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), which ￿nds in favor of
rising female wages and Greenwood and Guner (2004), which claims that the
falling price of home appliances is responsible.
This paper argues that a logical step towards resolving this issue is to com-
pare trends in the allocation of husband￿ s time to those of married women. While
it is well-known that average market hours worked has been declining for men,
time-use surveys show that their housework time has been increasing, while that
of women has been falling. Gershuny and Robinson (1988) show that this is true
of both the U.S. and the U.K. over the period 1965-85, and Aguiar and Hurst
(2005) con￿rm that, for the US at least, this trend extends through the 1990s.
Both papers show that these trends are not explained by trends in demographic
composition. According to Robinson and Godbey (1997), the decline in women￿ s
home hours since 1975 is ￿unprecedented" in the 20th century. However these
aggregate trends are not informative about the time allocation between spouses;
are the men whose market hours are falling married to the women whose market
hours are increasing or are they entirely unconnected? This paper argues that
the distinction is important for explaining trends in aggregate labor supply.
We use PSID data on market work and housework for households of wives
aged 25-45 to examine the allocation of leisure and housework between spouses.
We take as a measure of total working time the sum of market labor hours and
hours spent in housework We show that for husbands of working women, time
spent in household labor has been increasing, while that of their wives has been
falling. Furthermore, the husband￿ s leisure time has been falling while the wife￿ s
leisure has been increasing.
A common feature of most models of the trends in married-women￿ s time
trends is that labor supply decisions are made by a single agent, a common
and convenient abstraction from the complications of modeling the individual
spouses in a married couple. We ￿rst consider a simple version of the additive-
utility models of household behavior that constitute the work-horses of the lit-
erature in this area. We show that the two types of explanations referred to
above, rising relative wage and rising productivity at home, both imply that
husband￿ s leisure should be rising relative to wife￿ s leisure. This prediction is
indeed corroborated in the data, but only for men married to women older than
55.
It is natural to suspect that the problem is the excessive simplicity of our
model, perhaps the Cobb-Douglas preferences, or the absence of the home good
from the utility function, or the failure to incorporate wage dynamics or savings.
A recent paper by Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) refutes this view. In
a dynamic model which relaxes all of the above restrictions, and is calibrated to
2match US data, husband￿ s leisure is still predicted to increase by 5 hours over
this period. Furthermore that paper shows that under the alternative hypothesis
that women￿ s labor supply is driven by technical change in the home production
sector, then the expected increase in men￿ s leisure is considerably larger.
The unitary model fails therefore, even in far more sophisticated incarna-
tions. Some of this could be explained by interdependent preferences, but a
simpler and more fertile approach is to assume that the wife￿ s share of house-
hold utility has increased over time, contrary to the standard assumption that
the household is the decision-making unit.
To explain movements in the wife￿ s share of household utility, we trans-
form the unitary model by incorporating a simple model of bargaining between
spouses in which the outside option is life as a single person, as in McElroy and
Horney (1981). Relying on a standard solution concept, that the spouses split
the marital surplus equally, we can solve explicitly for the equilibrium leisure
allocation when the sexes di⁄er in their valuation of single life. The question,
when is husband￿ s leisure decreasing in the wife￿ s wage, can therefore be an-
swered explicitly. Roughly, this requires that the attractiveness of single life
be su¢ ciently high for women relative to men. On the basis of relative wages
and leisure for married couples in the US, we conclude that this condition was
indeed satis￿ed during the period under consideration.
Empirical support for a similar view of the household can be found in the
work of Mazzocco (2003). He shows that US household data on the labor
supply and consumption decisions of married couples is consistent with a model
in which households choose allocations on the Pareto frontier each period but
cannot commit over long periods of time. This means that, as in our model, the
wife￿ s share of household utility will increase in response to an increase in her
outside options, relative to those of her husband.
Two important components of the attractiveness of single life for women rel-
ative to men are marriage prospects and productivity in household work. Since
it is likely that both of these have changed substantially since the 1970s, we
embed the above household problem into an equilibrium setting where people,
whether currently single or married, choose between marriage and single life,
taking into account relative wages, productivity in housework, the joy (or mis-
ery) of being single, and an idiosyncratic match quality variable. We show that
the model has a unique equilibrium marriage rate, and solve for the allocation
of leisure.
The trends in leisure in our model are the result of trends in the attractive-
ness of single life. When single life becomes more appealing to women, then
wive￿ s share of household utility increases. The data suggests three di⁄erent
measurable sources of such a change: an exogenous decline in family size over
time, a decline in the price of home appliances, and an increase in the relative
wage of women. Understanding the trend in married women￿ s market labor
therefore requires a calibration of the model to gauge the relative importance
of these explanations.
At ￿rst glance, such an exercise appears too complex to contribute much to
our understanding of the issues. Once again, the separability of the housework
3allocation comes to our rescue, by allowing us to calibrate the home production
component ￿rst and then use the results in the calibration of the rest of the
model. The results suggest that the price trend accounts for about half of the
trend in housework time; the wage trend explains about a third, and the decline
in family size about 20%. With regards to leisure trends, we ￿nd they are
almost entirely due to the price trend. The change in relative wages has two
large and o⁄setting e⁄ects on market labor: on the one hand the price of wife￿ s
leisure increases, causing her market labor to increase by 50%, and on the other
hand, her share of household utility increases, causing her total working time
to decline.
To the best of our knowledge, the model developed in this paper is unique
in that it allows analytical results for endogenous labor supply of married cou-
ples. Previous equilibrium analysis of the relation between marriage and female
labor supply has been limited to computational results, as in Caucutt, Guner,
and Knowles (2002) and Regalia and R￿os-Rull (1999).1 Our model can be
seen as a simpli￿cation of Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003), which also
solves for equilibrium marriage rates when married-couple allocations are deter-
mined by a bargaining solution and are subject to an idiosyncratic match-quality
shock. While Chiappori and Weiss (2000), or Chade and Ventura (2004) also
develop very simple equilibrium-marriage models, those models do not allow for
labor supply decisions, and assume instead that the gains from marriage are
￿xed. Theoretically, the key di⁄erence is that in our model utility is partially
transferable, via the leisure allocation, while in the former, utility is perfectly
transferable, and in the latter non-transferable.
The rest of the paper is divided into seven parts: an empirical analysis in
Section 2, followed by an analysis of the unitary model in section 3, then an
analysis of the allocation of leisure in the bargaining model of the household.
Section 5 integrates housework into the model. Section 6 presents the quanti-
tative implications when the model is calibrated to US data. The conclusion
contains a summary of the results and suggestions for future research.
2 Trends in Time Allocation
In this section we document trends in the working time for married-couple
households in the U.S. The main variables of interest are the market labor
time and time spent in housework of each spouse. The sum of these is taken to
be total working time, and the remainder of total waking time as free time or
leisure.
The data is taken from the 1969-1997 waves of the PSID, excluding those
years in which housework data was not collected, such as 1975 and 1982. None
1Regalia and R￿os-Rull (1999) reports that, as in this paper, one can infer from US data
that women have a higher intrinsic enjoyment of single life. They infer this from the fact
that women tend to marry men higher in the wage distribution, and that higher wages are
associated among women with lower marriage rates, but among men with higher rates. Along
with the current paper, this suggests that both cross-sectional and time-series support this
view that women need marriage less than men do.
4of the analysis reported here exploits the panel nature of the study; the PSID
is used because it is the only annual cross-sectional dataset in the U.S. that
includes housework.
Our sample consists of all wives (or ￿wives") between the ages of 25 and 80
who report time spent in market labor and house work for both spouses. The
sample size grows over time, from 1018 households in 1969, to 3052 in 1997. This
results in a total number of annual observations equal to 69,762.To ensure that
the sample is representative, all statistics are weighted using the household￿ s
cross-sectional weight for each year. We also repeat the exercise for single men
and single women, as the model has implications for their time allocations.
The housework variable is the response to the question: "About how much
time does your (wife/"WIFE") spend on housework in an average week? I mean
time spent cooking, cleaning, and doing other work around the house." A similar
question is asked for husbands. This is not an ideal instrument in many ways,
particularly as the interpretation of housework may vary across sexes, and over
time. Nevertheless, the results reported here seem to be broadly consistent with
those reported on the basis of the American Time Use Survey in a number of
recent publications, including Aguiar and Hurst (2005), Robinson and Godbey
(1997) and Gershuny and Robinson (1988).
We take weekly hours worked in each category to be the annual numbers
reported, divided by 52. In order to ensure that extreme values of hours do not
distort the results, we top-code both market hours and housework hours at 90
hours weekly; this a⁄ects only the top percentile in each case.
Conceptually, this paper assumes there are two categories of time use: dis-
cretionary, which is divided into work or leisure, and non-discretionary, such as
sleep and personal care. This non-discretionary component corresponds to what
time-use researchers such as Robinson and Godbey (1997) call personal time,
while work corresponds to what they call "Total Productive Activity". Based
on data derived from the Americans Use of Time Project (ATUS), they ￿nd that
personal time averages about 70 hours weekly for both men and women over
the 1965-85 period, leaving 98 hours to divide between free time and productive
activity.2
The paper focuses on the portion of the sample consisting of women and
single men aged between 25 and 45 and the husbands of these women Summary
statistics for this sub-sample are shown in Table 1, which reports housework and
market hours, as well as annual earnings and family size for married and single
households. While the paper will focus on comparing two periods, 1969-75 ("the
early 70s") and 1988-1997 ("the 90s"), the table also reports a middle period,
1978-83. As expected, the table shows that the average wife￿ s time in market
work doubled over the period, from 12 hours weekly to 25, and that housework
hours fell from 34 hours to 21. Total working time for women declined slightly
more than an hour, from 47.8 hours to 46.5. For married men, housework hours
increased from two to seven weekly, while market hours declined from 44 to
2It is likely however that some part of personal time is discretionary; for instance, between
1975 and 1995, Robinson and Godbey (1997) report that time spent eating and grooming fell
by more than 5 hours for men compared to about 2 hours for women.




1969-1975 746 2.14 44.14 47.45 4.63 2.41
1978-1983 1634 6.25 41.89 49.05 3.97 1.77
1988-1997 3333 7.45 41.63 49.78 3.69 1.54
1969-1975 578 34.57 12.04 47.79 4.63 2.41
1978-1983 1299 28.37 18.03 47.14 3.97 1.77
1988-1997 2709 20.99 25.08 46.45 3.69 1.54
1969-1975 54 7.00 37.77 44.77 1.47 0.30
1978-1983 305 9.13 36.32 45.45 1.41 0.29
1988-1997 739 8.42 37.00 45.41 1.38 0.25
1969-1975 150 19.39 25.32 44.71 3.12 1.77
1978-1983 436 15.68 29.20 44.88 2.37 1.13
1988-1997 1050 13.06 30.43 43.49 2.22 1.02
Married Men,  Wife aged 25-45
Married Women, aged 25-45
Single Men aged 25-45
Single Women aged 25-45
Table 1: Hours worked, earnings and family size in PSID for households where
wife or head is aged 25-45 years.
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Single Men aged 25-45
Single Women aged 25-45
Table 2: Hours worked, earnings and family size in PSID for ￿working" house-
holds where wife or head is aged 25-45 years.
41. For this broad sample, the relative leisure of the husband declined from
100% of the wife￿ s leisure time, to 94%. The table also implies that the relative
housework time of the wife fell from 16 times that of the husband to three times.
.In Table 2, we further restrict the sample to "working households", by which
we mean married households where the wife works 10 hours or more outside the
home, and single households where the head works 25 hours or more outside the
home. The main di⁄erence from Table 1 is that we see a much larger decline
in husband￿ s leisure relative to the wife￿ s, from 120% to about 100%. This is
an important distinction, because it suggests that wives experience a decline in
relative leisure when they move into the labor force, while for women who would
have been in the labor force anyway, relative leisure has increased over time.
To ensure that other demographic changes over the same period are not
driving the ￿nding of the trends in time allocation, we turn to Table 3, which
restricts attention to household where the wife works 30 hours or more weekly.
The table shows that the size of the decline in husband￿ s relative leisure when
the wife is between 35 and 44 years old ranges from 12% when the wife did not
complete high school to 16% for college-educated wives. The change is uniformly

















Table 3: Percent decline in husband￿ s relative leisure in households where the
wife spends 25 hours or more weekly in paid market work.
smaller when the wife is aged between 45 and 54 years old: for drop-outs the
change in relative leisure is 7%, and only 3% for high-school graduates. For the
youngest group, where the wife is aged 25-34, the relative leisure of the husband
fell by 17% in the case of dropouts, 12% for high-school graduates, and 7% for
college-educated women.
The trends over time for the 25￿ 34 and 35-44 age groups in this sub-sample
are shown in Figure 2. The total hours worked of these women declines no-
ticeably, from an average of 59 hours in the early 1970s to 54.4 hours in the
1990s, as home hours decline from 22.5 to 16 hours, while market hours remain
constant. The total hours worked of their husbands however increases from 47
to 49 hours on average. Hence the rise in wife￿ s working hours appears to be
quite steady since the beginning of the 1970s, as is the increase in husband￿ s
working time.
To summarize, we see that for households where wives are under age 55,
the shift in the allocation of the leisure away from the husband is somewhat
stronger after controlling for age, education and full-time employment. By way
of contrast, consider the households where the wife was aged between 55 and
65. In that slightly older group, men￿ s leisure actually increased relative to the
wife￿ s, by about 5% for college-educated wives, and by 10% for the others.
What about single people? Table 1 shows that housework hours rise by
about 20 percent for single men, fall by about a third for single women, while
market hours remained roughly constant for men, and increased for women.
Working time of single men increased by about 0.9 hours for single men, and
fell by 1.5 hours for single women. In Table 2 we see that conditional on working
there was very little change in the total of working time of single women.
The overall picture is perhaps clearer in Figure 3, which shows that average
81 2 3 4
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Table 4: Estimated coe¢ cients for log of total weekly housework hours.
9working time for singles age 25-44 ￿ uctuated without trend around an average
of 45 hours for both sexes.
Table 2 also suggests a possible explanation of the decline in wife￿ s home
hours: a decline in family size over the same period. In the early 70s, average
family size for married couples was 4.2; this fell to 3.5 by the 1990s. Almost all
of this decline was due to the number of children at home, which declined from
1.92 to 1.38. To the extent that mother￿ s time allocation is more responsive
to the presence of children, then this decline would in turn cause an increase in
wife￿ s leisure relative to the husband￿ s, holding constant the other components
of the household allocation.
We attempt to measure the various e⁄ects associated with the trend in house-
work hours by running an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is
the log of the sum of the housework hours of both head and spouse for married
couples, and of the housework hours of the head for singles. Table 4 reports the
results when the excluded group is married with zero kids. Four speci￿cations
are reported, the simplest of which shows that single males spend 50% less time
than married in housework, and single women about 85% less, while parents
of one child spend 43% more time in housework. Additional children appear
to increase housework time by 13% each. This result suggests that people are
including at least some portion of childcare in their responses to the questions
about housework.
Speci￿cation 2 shows that the estimates are robust to controlling for educa-
tion of the head. In the last two speci￿cations, the estimates suggest that home
hours fell about 18% for married couples, 5% for single women, and actually
rose 7% for single men. This latter e⁄ect disappears after adding controls for
labor-force status of the head. By contrast, controlling for labor force status
causes the 1990￿ s e⁄ect to converge to about -11% for both married and single
women. The overall picture then, conditional on labor-force status, is one in
which housework fell for women, rose for married men, and remained constant
for single men. We now turn to consider explanations of the most striking
feature of the data, the 20% decline in the relative leisure of the husbands of
working women aged 25-45.
3 A Simple Unitary Model
In the analysis that follows we concentrate upon the households of women aged
25-45; we ignore the younger and older groups because their time allocations
are likely linked to education and retirement decisions, respectively, which are
outside the scope of this paper. We will consider ￿rst the question of why the
allocation of leisure did not increase in favor of husbands, and then ask why the
house-work time of husbands should have increased, while that of their wives
declined so dramatically.
Suppose that preferences of individuals are given by:
e u(c;l) = ln￿c + ￿ lnl
10where c is household consumption (public good ), l is leisure. ￿ is a constant.
Each person i has a time endowment of one unit of time, which is allocated
across three competing uses: leisure li, market work, ni and housework hi.The
time constraint is:
li + ni + hi = 1
A person of sex i gets wage wi per unit of market labor and buys home appliances
k at price p, so the budget constraint of the household is given by
c + wili + wjlj = I (hi;hj;kjwi;wj;p)
where
I (hi;hj;kjwi;wj;p) = (wi + wj)T ￿ wihi ￿ wjhj ￿ pk
.There is also a home good that is produced using inputs of housework time
(hi;hj); as well as a ￿ ow of appliances, k, according to a production function
G: Married couples are constrained to produce a minimum level of the home




3.0.1 Optimal Time Allocation of Married Couples
Suppose consumption is a public good in the marriage, so that consumption per
capita equals ￿c, where c represents expenditures, and ￿ 2 [0:5;1] is a constant.
3 The household decisions, given that spouse i has Pareto-weight ￿i in the
couple￿ s utility function, are given by the solution to the following problem:
max
li;lj
fln￿c + ￿i￿ lnli + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿ lnljg (1)
subject to the budget and home-production constraints.
De￿ne full income as the solution to the income maximization problem:
Y m (w;p) = max
hi;hj;k
fI (hi;hj;kjwi;wj)g
subject to the home-production constraint.
gm = Gm (k;hi;hj)











3Later we will make this depend on the number of children, but this dependence has no
e⁄ect on the qualitative model, provided that ￿ is constant over time.
11This is an instance of the well-known result that expenditure shares are
constant with Cob-Douglas preferences.4
3.1 Relative Leisure in the Unitary Household




= e l(e w) (2)
Blau and Kahn (1997) report that the average wages of women working full
time rose, as a fraction of men￿ s, from 0.60 to 0.76 over the period 1975 to 1995.








. If there were no change in wife￿ s leisure, then, taking average leisure in 1970 to
be 40 hours per week each as per Robinson and Godbey (1997), then husband￿ s
leisure should have increased by about 10 hours.
For older husbands, those married to women aged 55 or older, we do in fact
observe a decline of this order in market hours. However for younger men, the
predicted decline is so large relative to any observed trend in the data that it
seems unlikely that tweaking the preferences or adding home production are
going to solve the problem. The results of Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003) corroborate this conjecture for both wage-based explanations of the rise
in women￿ s market hours.
In this model it is easy to solve for the Pareto weight given the observed
leisure and relative wages. We observed in Table 2 that husband￿ s leisure was
1.2 times that of working wives in the 1970s. Setting e w = 0:60, and inverting









, implying that husbands are getting a larger share of the utility in the marriage.
How do the results change when we plug in the changes in wages and relative
leisure? We observed that husband￿ s leisure equalled that of working wives in









So the Pareto weight of the husband would have to fall by 15% in order
to explain the change in leisure allocation of households where the wife was
working 10 or more hours outside of the home.
4In the appendix we deal with the corner-solution case where wives do not work outside
the home. The solution requires that we consider the technology for home production, which
we defer until later in the paper. Since the focus of the paper is the change in the allocations
of households where the wives are working, we defer all discussion of this case to the end.
12To understand aggregate trends in household labor supply therefore requires
a theory of these weights. In what follows, we will rely on bargaining models, in
which the solution depends on the gains from marriage. Since the motivation for
considering a bargaining model involves the observation that husband￿ s leisure is
not increasing, it is essential to consider the conditions under which an increase
in the wife￿ s wage causes men￿ s leisure to fall.
The optimality condition implies the following response of leisure of spouse












1 + e w
.
Proposition 1 If the following condition is satis￿ed, then for wife￿ s relative
leisure to rise when the wife￿ s wage increases requires that
d
de w














So the more responsive is the wife￿ s share to her wage, the more likely it
is that husband￿ s leisure declines when her wage rises. To see under what
conditions this might happen, we now consider a simple theory of the weight
￿j:5
4 The Allocation of the Marital Surplus
Consider a marriage in which the total surplus is positive. The allocation of
the surplus between the two spouses is equivalent to the choice of the Pareto
weights ￿j in the couple￿ s problem. To understand how these might evolve over
time, in response to trends in relative wages or in non-market productivity, we
turn to bargaining models of the married couple. We consider the ￿egalitar-
ian" solution concept, in which the marital surplus is split equally between the
spouses. When utility is perfectly transferable, which is not the case here, this
is usually equivalent to the Nash solution, which maximizes the product of the
gains from marriage. We abstract from any consideration of the process by
which the solutions are attained. The advantage of the egalitarian solution is
that it is analytically tractable, as well as simple and plausible.6
In general, bargaining theories are mappings from the spouse￿ s marriage
gains onto a point on the Pareto frontier. Hence the next step is to compute
the gains from marriage. Since this depends on the projected length of the
marriage, and the value of being single in turn depends on the probability of
marriage, we begin by embedding the static model into a simple in￿nite-horizon
5Note that if this condition is satis￿ed, then the spouses￿ s leisure will be increasing in her
own wage, because of the symmetry of the problem.
6To preserve tractability, it is critical that each spouse get exactly half of the surplus; this
causes any utility term that is equal for both spouses to drop out of the problem.
13marriage model. Because the model abstracts from divorce costs and long-term
commitment, the marriage probability determines the divorce probability. We
proceed by ￿rst working out the equilibrium leisure allocations, taking the mar-
riage rate as given, and then in the next section work out how the equilibrium
marriage rates depend on full income by marital status.
We assume there is a very large marriage population with equal number
of both sexes, that people live forever and that time is divided into discrete
periods. People of a given sex are identical. All marriages and separations are
e¢ cient ex post. Couples who married in some previous period cannot choose
a di⁄erent sharing rule than newly-married couples, and divorce or marriage is
costless. Also, we assume that the process for match quality is independent of
marital status. Finally, we require that the values of the wage and the quality
of single life do not change over time.
At the beginning of each period, people are either married or single. Married
people receive a match-quality shock ", and then married couples choose whether
to stay together or to divorce and become singles. All singles are then randomly
paired with a single of the opposite sex, the new pairs then learn their match
quality and decide whether to marry. After the marriage decisions, households
choose their time allocations over market and house work, and get utility from
leisure, match quality and consumption of household earnings.
4.1 Single People
Suppose that when people are single they get some additional utility qi which
is sex-speci￿c; the preferences of individuals are given by:
e u(ci;li;qi) = lnci + ￿ lnli + ￿ lnqi
A single person of sex i faces budget and home-production constraints given by:
c + wili ￿ wi (T ￿ hi) ￿ pk = IS (hi;kjwi)
G(k;hi) ￿ gs
De￿ne full income as the solution to the income maximization problem:















The ￿ ow utility from being single is:
Us
i (p;wi;qi) = KS + (1 + ￿)lnY s (p;wi) ￿ ￿ lnwi + ￿ lnqi
KS = ￿ ln￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)ln(1 + ￿)
144.2 The Gains from Marriage
The ￿ ow utility from being married, including the idiosyncratic match-quality
variable " is given by:
e UM
i (p;w;q;";￿i) = UM
i (w;p) + ￿ ln￿i + ￿ ln"
where
UM
i (w;p) = KM + (1 + ￿)lnY m (w;p) ￿ ￿ lnwi
and
KM = ln￿ + KS
The di⁄erence in ￿ ow utilities, excluding the marital share and the match
quality, is
e UM
i (p;w;q;";￿i) = UM
i (w;p) + ￿ ln￿i (p;w;q;") + ￿ ln"
￿i (￿ijp;wi;qi) = UM
i (w;p;￿i) ￿ Us
i (p;wi;qi)




We show in the appendix that there is a unique equilibrium marriage rate.
The main simplifying assumption we need to get this result is that the Pareto
weight is independent of the current marriage quality.
4.3 The Egalitarian solution
Suppose that spouses agree to split the gains from marriage evenly, so that the
share ￿i solves
Wi (w;q;"j￿i) = Wj (w;q;"j1 ￿ ￿i)
, where Wi (w;q;"j￿i) is the gain from marriage for a person of sex i: We call
this the Egalitarian solution; it is also known as the "split the surplus rule".
We show in the appendix that if married couples can not condition ￿i on
the current match quality ", then the Egalitarian solution equates the gains in
￿ ow utility from marriage. This implies















i (p;wj), e q =
qj
qi and recall that e w =
wj
wi:The Pareto weight implied
by this equation is given by
￿i (p;w;q;") =
1
1 + e qe y
1+￿
￿
15This says that the bargaining position of spouse j is summarized by the product
of her relative wage, her relative enjoyment of single life and her relative full
income as a single.7 Take i to refer to the husband. Since w < 1 then for
￿ > 1
1+￿M an increase in the marriage rate will make the relative wage a less
important determinant of household allocations.
The leisure of spouse i will fall in response to a decline in e y when the following
condition is satis￿ed:
e q > q =
1
e ya [a(1 + e y) ￿ e y]
(4)
, where a = 1+￿
￿ :
For simplicity, suppose that ratio of full incomes
Y
m(w;p)
Y s(p;wi) equals the wage
ratio, e w: Then we can compute women￿ s relative joy of single life e q; using the
solution for ￿i :
￿i (e w) =
1
1 + e q e w
1+￿
￿
Suppose that ￿ = 1:5, so that average leisure is 60% of the time endowment,
and that ￿1970
i = 0:67, as in the previous section.: If the relative wage in 1970
is e w = 0:6; what does e q have to be to match ￿1970
i ?
￿i (g w70) =
1
1 + e q (0:6)




Therefore women in 1970 enjoyed single life more than men do; or at least, they
needed marriage less, holding income constant.
The Egalitarian solution has a very strong implication for trends in relative
leisure: suppose that we can write the full-income ratio as e y = e wa. Then relative
leisure and the wage are related by
￿j =
e q e wa+
1+￿
￿
1 + e q e wa+
1+￿
￿
Combining with the expression for relative leisure, we can solve for e l.





1 + e we l
=
e q e wa+
1+￿
￿
1 + e q e wa+
1+￿
￿
) e l = e q e w
1+a￿
￿
This says that if 1+a￿
￿ > 1, then the relative leisure of the wife should grow
at a faster rate than the relative wage, holding e q constant. This holds whenever
7Note that marriage prospects play no role here in determining the impact of changes in
relative wages on the Pareto weights. We show in that appendix that in the Nash solution,
marriage prospects will a⁄ect the Pareto weights.
16a > 1￿ 1
￿:In the next section we show that a > 1 is a reasonable assumption, so
we should indeed expect relative leisure to grow more quickly. However Table
2 suggests that the growth rates of leisure and the relative wage are roughly
equal.
One way to resolve this is to assume that the trend in e w is exaggerated
and solve the model for the growth rate of the relative wage that generates the










An alternative approach is to consider a bargaining solution that is less
responsive to wage changes.
4.4 Nash￿ s Bargaining Solution
We show in the appendix that, whereas the Egalitarian solution sets the ratio of
the gains from marriage equal to a constant, the Nash solution sets them equal
to the ratio of derivatives of the gains:
Wi (￿i)









This implies that the Nash solution will be less responsive to wages because
concavity of utility for leisure will make it more costly to give a spouse more
utility when her wage increases. Although we cannot solve explicitly for ￿i it is
clear that, if the marriage is individually rational, then a unique solution exists,
as the LHS is increasing in ￿i from some very large negative number to a large
positive one, while the RHS is decreasing in ￿i from some very large positive
number to zero.
5 Home Production
It is clear from the preceding analysis that we need a theory of the levels of full
income by household type even before making predictions concerning leisure, let
alone housework time. This requires that we expand the analysis to explicitly
model the decisions concerning housework.
If the technology for production of the home good were constant over time,
then we could subsume it into the parameters (￿; e q):However Figure 5 shows
that the price of home appliances has fallen by 50% since the 1970s, and as
Greenwood and Guner (2004) point out, this could a⁄ect both the attractiveness
of single life and the opportunity cost of market labor.8
8The prices series are drawn from NIPA data on the BLS web page:
http://www.bea.gov/beahome.html. The price of home durables is taken as the ratio
of the price index for home durables and furniture to the GDP de￿ator.
17There is another potential e⁄ect in our model: a decline in p may cause the
attractiveness of single life to women to change at a di⁄erent rate than that for
men, changing the Pareto weights of the married couples and therefore a⁄ecting
the allocation of leisure time. In what follows we are going to rig the model so
that all of these e⁄ects are present, maximizing the opportunity for the trend
in durables prices to explain both the trend in housework hours and in leisure
time of married couples. We do this by allowing the e⁄ect of the durables on
productivity to di⁄er by sex, as otherwise the decline in p cannot explain the
rise in husband￿ s home hours relative to the wife￿ s.
5.1 Technology
We now turn to the determination of full income. Recall from the discussion
of the unitary model that this can be written as the solution to the following
problem of the married couple:




gm = Gm (k;hi;hj)
Lets start from the assumption that the married-couples technology is separable
between capital and some homothetic aggregate H (hi;hj) of the spouse￿ s home
time. Then the ￿rst-order conditions imply that the ratio of housework times






This would preclude the trend in appliance prices explaining the rapid rise in
ratio hi
hj that we documented in the empirical section. For a decline in p to
match observed rise in hi
hj requires that k be more complementary with hi than










5.2 Home Hours of Single People
Another advantage of this technology is that it is easily applied to singles. Con-
sider a single person of sex i: Once again, we can consider the income maxi-
mization problem separately:
Y s (p;wi) = max
hi;ki
IS (hi;kjp;wi) = max
hi;ki
fwi (T ￿ hi) ￿ pkig
subject to
gs = Gs (ki;hi) ￿ zik￿ih
1￿￿i
i
18For singles it is easy to solve the model for optimal household hours. An







































This means that costs increase less than proportionally with wages, so the per-
cent increase in full income resulting from a wage change is greater than the
percentage increase in the wage.













greater than the wage ratio when ￿i = ￿j and zi = zj:The high-wage sex will
substitute away from labor, and so costs increase by less than wages. The elas-
ticity of the housework cost with respect to wages is 1 ￿ ￿i, so if the high-wage
is also the one with high ￿i, this will further increase the income ratio over the
wage ratio. In this case, convergence of relative wages will cause the income ra-
tio to fall by more than the decline of the relative wage. Given the dependence
in our model of the Pareto weight on the relative wage, this implies that in this
case home production magni￿es the e⁄ect of wage changes on leisure.
Finally the elasticity of the housework cost with respect to p is given by
￿i:This implies full income will increase more for the sex with higher ￿ when
there is a decline in p:
What about the e⁄ect of trends in w and p on marriage rates? We showed
earlier this depends on the ratio of full income of singles to that of married.
Since the cost function is more complicated for married couples than for singles,
we defer this analysis to the quantitative section below.
6 Calibration
The objective of this section is to learn how much of the trends in relative
housework and leisure time of married couples can be attributed to each of the
competing explanations. To achieve this, we now calibrate the model to match
average time allocations for the US in the 1970s, as well as the married couple￿ s
home hours in the 1990s.
We then use this calibrated model as a benchmark to compare to restricted
versions of the model, in which we allow only for one of these trends at a time:
19the relative wage, the appliances price or family size. From these exercises we
infer how the relative importance of each hypothesis.
We require that the model match summary statistics from the PSID sample
analyzed in Tables 2 and 4 above; recall that the statistics are drawn from the
portion of the sample where the head or the wife is aged 45 or less and the wife
is working at least 10 hours weekly.. We look at the means over the 70s and the
90s, by marital status, as well as the partial e⁄ects of demographic di⁄erences
on total housework time, as reported in Table 4.
Since the home-hours allocation in the model is related to the leisure allo-
cation only through the determination of full income, we start by calibrating
the home-production side of the model in order to generate estimates of full
income by marital status over the two periods. We then use the output of this
calibration to calibrate the remainder of the model to match the leisure alloca-
tion observed in the 1970s, as well as the change in the prevalence of marriage
between the 1970s and the 1990s.
6.1 Housework
We assume the production of the home good is given by the function G(k;hi;hj)
described above with zj normalized to one. This leaves as free parameters
(￿i;￿j;zi;￿): To parametrize the housework model we also need a functional
form for the dependence of the home constraint on family composition. We
assume this is given by
gm (ms;nk) = ￿ms + ￿nkn
￿2
k
. Here ￿ms is a constant that varies according to whether the household is a
married couple, a single man or a single woman, ￿nk and ￿2 are constants that
are the same for all households.
The housework model makes predictions only about home hours and spend-
ing on appliances, so we choose as targets both the mean time married couples
spent in housework from Table 2 above (expressed as a fraction of 98 hours),
and the partial e⁄ects of being single or a parent from Table 4. To identify
the role of technology, we need a target from 1997; we target the housework
hours of husbands. We also require the model to match share of household
income spent by married couples on home durables in 1970.9 To compute the
partial e⁄ects, we solve the model for married and single women households
with di⁄erent number of children under the 1970 parameters.
For the benchmark model, we assume that the relative wage e w evolves from
0.61 in the 1970s to 0.76 in the 1990s, to match the observations in Blau and
Kahn (2000), and that ten percent of this change is illusory. 10the price p of
home capital k, relative to the husband￿ s wage, evolves from 3.2 to 1.6, matching
9We compute this from the CEX in 1972-73. Details are in the appendix.
10We know that the observed wage change is likely to include the e⁄ects of selectivity and
investment, as pointed out by many recent papers on the gender gap, including Blau and








Women's Durables Share 0.080
Men's Durables Share 0.220
Men's Relative TFP 1.401




Table 5: Benchmark Parameters for the Housework Allocation
the evolution of the ratio of the price of home durables to the GDP de￿ ator
documented in the previous section. The resulting parameter values are shown
in Table 5. In the home technology, the crucial point is that men have a higher
share of durables in their production function than do women. This means that
as households acquire more durables, men become relatively more productive in
home work. The value of 1.4 for men￿ s total factor productivity does not imply
that men are more productive than women in the home; without appliances,
men are severely handicapped according to these parameters.
Table 6 shows the match between the targets and the model. This is very
close; the main discrepancy is that the model cannot get husband￿ s hours at
home su¢ ciently low in the 1970s without screwing up on the other dimensions.
However, relative to the wife￿ s hours the discrepancy is very small.
Table 7 shows home labor in the 1990s for the benchmark, and then three
experiments, all using the benchmark parameters. In the benchmark model,
husband and wife￿ s home labor were targets, so the close match is by construc-
tion. However it is interesting to note that the hours of single women are quite
close to the data; the model explains about 2/3 of the decline in home hours of
single women.
So what then explains the decline in wife￿ s home hours from 0.26 of her time
endowment to 0.17? The results for the experiments show that the decline in
family size explains about 20% of the decline, the trend in wages about 33%
and the trend in the home appliances price about 50%. We conclude from this
table that the trend in the price of durables is the most important component
for explaining the trends in the wife￿ s home hours. On the other hand, it is the
rise in women￿ s relative wage that explains most of the increase in husband￿ s
home hours.






Single Women 0.19 0.19
Single Men 0.07 0.07
Mother 0.43 0.43




Durables Share of Income 0.02 0.02
Targets
Home Hours in 1970
Home Hours Partial Effects








Wife* 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.22
Husbands* 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05
Single Women 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.18
Single Men 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
Married Couples -- 1.07 1.01 1.04 1.01
Single Women -- 1.19 1.04 1.13 1.02
Single Men -- 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.02
Full Income, 90s/70s
Results
Home Labor Hours in 1990s
Table 7: Other Results for the housework model
22changes on full income, according to the benchmark model, was an increase
of 7 per cent for married couples, 19 per cent for single women, and a much
smaller increases, 2% for single men. In contrast to the e⁄ects on home hours,
the table shows that the wage trend is far more important than the price trend
for explaining the increase in the full income of single women. This will have
strong implications for the allocation of leisure in the married couple household.
In terms of the larger question of what determines labor supply, the results so
far are in rough accordance with Greenwood and Guner (2004). If we left leisure
out of our model, as they do, then the decline in home hours would be re￿ ected
entirely in an increase in market work. In such a simpli￿ed version of the model
therefore, we would ￿nd the decline in durables prices to be responsible for
more than half of the increase in female labor supply. Whether this argument is
modi￿ed by considering the allocation of leisure depends on two features of the
model: the weight ￿ of leisure in the utility function, and the responsiveness of
the Pareto weight to changes in the full income of singles.
6.2 Leisure
Given the results for full income and spouse￿ s leisure we can now turn to under-
standing the changes in leisure allocation, and hence labor supply. We begin by
abstracting from the e⁄ect of the decline in family size. The remaining parame-
ters are the values by sex of single life, and the utility weight on leisure. We nor-
malize the husbands joy of single life to qi = 1:As we saw earlier, the remaining
parameters are pinned down by the labor supply, once we know the full income
for each type of household. Using the full-income results from the calibration,
and the leisure for married people in the 1970s, from Table 2, we solve the model
for the parameters. This implies the following values: (e q;￿) = (1:54;1:36):
The implications of this parameterization for leisure and market labor are
shown in Table 8. The ￿rst ￿nding is that the benchmark model accounts for
about 80% of the rise in wife￿ s market labor time, and 90% of the fall in the
ratio of husband￿ s relative leisure, from 1.19 in the 1970s to 1.0 in the 1990s.
Since the wives in the data are working in the market, we are not claiming to
explain the rise in married-women￿ s labor force participation of course, only the
rise in hours of women conditional on participating. For single men the results
are within 10 percent of the observed labor supply, which is the same in both
periods, while the model has trouble explaining the low hours of single women.
The experiments reported in Table 9 show how omission of one or the other
of the trends changes these results, holding the model parameters constant.
Experiment 1 shows that if all but the relative wage had been constant, then
wive￿ s labor supply would not have increased signi￿cantly. This is because the
rise in her wage causes her Pareto weight to increase from 0.35 to 0.4, and
hence the wife gets more leisure; husband￿ s relative leisure declines from 1.19 to
1.08 instead of 1.02. However in Experiment 2, when all but the price of home
appliances is constant, we see that the leisure ratio is remains constant at the
1970s level. While the price trend appears to explain the entire increase in wife￿ s
labor supply, the Pareto weights are constant, because, as we saw in Table 6,
23Married Leisure in 1970s
Wife 0.44 0.44
Husband 0.52 0.52
Leisure Ratio 1.19 1.19
Married Labor  in 1990's
Wife 0.35 0.34
Husband 0.44 0.43
Married Leisure in 1990's
Wife 0.48 0.49
Husband 0.48 0.50




Singles Labor in 1970's
Men 0.38 0.41
Women 0.27 0.36
Singles Labor  in 1990's
Men 0.38 0.41
Women 0.32 0.37
Bargaining Results Data Benchmark
Table 8: Benchmark Leisure and Market Labor Allocations
















Married Labor  in 1990's
Wife 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.42
Husband 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.38
Married Leisure in 1990's
Wife 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.42
Husband 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.56
Leisure Ratio 1.08 1.19 1.12 0.96 1.34
Husband's Pareto weight
1970's 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
1990's 0.60 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.65
Experiments
Results
Table 9: Computational Experiments for Leisure Allocation
the full income of singles grows at roughly the same rate for men and women.
So then what explains the decline in the leisure ratio from 1.08 to 1.02? In
Experiment 3 the only di⁄erence between the 70￿ s and the 90s is the family size.
We see that relative leisure declines to 1.12, fully accounting for the residual
that was not explained by the wage trend. Therefore the wage trend accounts
for 3/4 of the movement in relative leisure, and family-size trends for 1/4.
To clarify the e⁄ect of the wage trend it is useful to separate the e⁄ects of the
wage and price trends on leisure from the e⁄ect on home production. Suppose
that in the 1990s, households took into account the wage change only in the
home production decisions, and then made leisure decisions as if the relative
wage were still as in the 1970s. This means taking full income as given by
the 1990s relative wage, and the cost of leisure according to the 1970s wages.
The results are shown in Experiment 4. Relative leisure drops to 0.96, far below
what we see in the data, because although the resulting bargaining weight is the
same as in the benchmark, the cost of wife￿ s leisure did not increase. with the
wage. Consequently, wife￿ s labor supply actually drops by 33%. In other words
the model says that, when wife￿ s wages increase relative to the husband￿ s, the
shift in bargaining power that results from her higher wage almost completely
o⁄sets the increase in the cost of her leisure, so the e⁄ect of a permanent wage
change on married women￿ s labor supply is very small.
To compare with the unitary model, Table 9 includes an experiment in which
the utility share of the marriage is held constant. Experiment 5 shows that both
wife￿ s labor supply and husband￿ s leisure should have increased much more than
we see in the data, as we would expect, given the discussion of the unitary model.
The role of the bargaining in the model is seen most clearly by comparing the
25leisure ratios; whereas the 1990s ratio was 1.02 in the benchmark model, in
Experiment 5 it rises to 1.34.
In summary, the calibration results tell us that trends in relative wages have
little e⁄ect overall on married women￿ s labor supply, conditional on the wife
working, but large e⁄ects on the allocation of leisure within the household. The
e⁄ect of the wage trend is much larger than that of the decline in family size.
The trend in wife￿ s labor supply, at least on the intensive margin, appears to
be entirely due to the price trend in home durables.
7 Conclusion
This paper had three closely-related goals. The ￿rst was to determine whether
the trends in the time allocation of married men did actually ￿t the pattern
implied by the class of models generally used to explain labor supply of married
women. The second goal was to develop an alternative model in which trends in
the optimal allocation of leisure and housework could potentially be accounted
for by the two most prominent explanations in the current literature, a rise
in women￿ s wages relative to men￿ s, and a decline in the price of labor-saving
home technology. The third goal was to use the model to measure the relative
importance of each explanation.
We used data from the PSID to show that there has been a signi￿cant decline
in the leisure of men married to women who work and are between the ages of
25 and 45. From a theoretical point of view the critical observation is that the
ratio of husband￿ s leisure time to that of the wife has declined from 1.2 to 1.00.
Husband￿ s relative leisure declined by 17% in households where the wife did not
complete high-school, works more than 25 hours weekly, and was between 25
and 34 years old, and by 16% when the wives were aged 35-44 with a college
education.
We showed that labor-supply models in which unitary households maximize
the sum of the spouse￿ s utility could not explain this negative trend in husband￿ s
relative leisure. It is easy to see that plugging the observed change in relative
wages into a unitary model with Cobb-Douglas preferences results in a predicted
20% increase in the husband￿ s leisure relative to the wife￿ s.
To remedy the problem with the unitary model, we proposed a simple bar-
gaining model of marriage, divorce and allocations of leisure-time and house-
work. Using the ￿egalitarian" solution concept and an in￿nite-horizon assump-
tion allowed us to solve analytically for the married-couple￿ s Pareto weights and
the optimal decisions. What mattered for predicting leisure, in addition to the
relative wage, was the extent to which the non-pecuniary quality of single life
was higher for women than for men. A rise in women￿ s relative wage was found
to reduce husband￿ s leisure when the quality of single life is relatively high for
women. A fall in the price of home durables can also cause husband￿ s leisure to
fall, if this causes full income of single women to rise faster than that of single
men.
26Calibration to US data shows the trend in relative wages explains 3/4 of the
trend in relative leisure and about a half of the trend in hours of housework,
while the simultaneous trend in home-durables prices explains the balance of
the housework trend. The balance of the trend in relative leisure is explained by
the trend in family size. To answer the question in the title, the reason married
men are working so much is that the husband￿ s share of household utility is
falling in response to the rise in women￿ s relative wages.
The small rise in wife￿ s market hours in our sample is entirely explained
by the trend in home-durables prices. The trend in relative wages has little
e⁄ect on wife￿ s market hours because the wife￿ s Pareto weight in the marriage
increases with her wage, causing her leisure to increase. This is in part be-
cause the solution concept does not consider the cost of awarding utility to each
spouse. Nash￿ s solution concept on the other hand would be less responsive to
the relative wage, and hence the wage elasticity of wife￿ s market labor would be
higher.
As they stand, the results have no direct implications for female labor supply
trends, because we ignore movements on the extensive margin, which are known
to be the most important component of these trends. However we did show that
relative leisure of husbands is likely to increase when wives enter the labor force,
and this is indeed what we see in the data. The results suggest that future work
could distinguish between competing hypotheses of this trend on the extensive
margin by considering the implications of movements on the intensive margin
for the allocation of leisure between spouses.
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A Appendix
A.1 Labor-Force Participation
In the body of the paper, we have assumed that the wife labor supply to the
market is greater than zero. This is what permits us to separate the leisure
allocation from home production. In this section we show that if the wife￿ s
optimal market labor is zero, then a decline in the price of home goods will
cause the relative leisure of the husband to fall. This implies we cannot infer
shifts in Pareto weights for households where women are not supplying market
labor unless we model the home-production technology.
To keep things simple, let￿ s assume that the husband does not do housework
unless the wife works. In this case, when the wife is not working outside the
home, the household problem is:
max
li;lj
fln[￿wi (1 ￿ li) ￿ pk] + ￿i￿ lnli + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ lnljg
subject to:
gm = zj (1 ￿ lj)
1￿￿j k￿j
This implies wife￿ s leisure is a function of home durables k :









1￿￿j = 1 ￿ ak￿b

































The ￿rst-order conditions for this problem imply that the leisure ratio is a










. The marginal e⁄ect of a decline in p is to increase the leisure of the wife,
relative to that of the husband, provided that she continues not to work, and
provided that the price elasticity of k is less than 1
1￿b = 1 ￿ ￿j:
Let ￿ be the shadow price of wife￿ s leisure. Then the home production
problem is
maxfwi ￿ pk ￿ ￿hjg
subject to:
gm = zj (1 ￿ lj)
1￿￿j k￿j





















The price elasticity of k is ￿j, so holding ￿ constant, the husband￿ s leisure
will fall relative to the wife￿ s when p falls, provided that ￿j < 1￿￿j , ￿j < 1=2:
Given that the value of the average wife￿ s housework time appears very large
relative to spending on durables in the data, it is likely that this condition is
easily met.
Is husband￿ s relative leisure greater in households where wives do not work,
holding ￿i constant? This requires that k
1￿b
ab > 1. Given that k is small relative
to spending on housework time, this appears unlikely. Therefore the entry
of non-working wives into the labor force is likely to cause husband￿ s relative
leisure to rise, holding ￿j constant. This can explain why the change in relative
leisure that we observe in the data is much stronger when we condition on wives
working in the market.
Of course the gains from marriage also contain an important dynamic com-
ponent. We therefore turn to a consideration of marriage prospects.
30A.2 Equilibrium in the Marriage Market
To solve for the equilibrium marriage rate, we make some simplifying assump-
tions regarding the process for match quality. We take match quality to be iid
with a uniform distribution function F over support (0; "]: To ensure that mar-
riage occurs in the equilibrium, we assume that a marriage with match quality
" generates a positive net surplus.
Since the gains from marriage are increasing in match quality, there is some
minimum threshold value "M such that people will get married if and only









Lemma 2 The gains from marriage are given by
Wi (") = e UM

















Proof. Let ￿i (") denote the equilibrium of the bargaining game, conditional on
the deterministic state variables (q;w;p):Let￿ s ￿x these, so we can drop them
from the function arguments. Given the assumed preferences, we can write the
￿ ow utility from marriage as
e UM
i (";￿i) = UM
i + ￿ ln￿i (") + ￿ ln"
where
UM
i = KM + (1 + ￿)lnY m ￿ ￿ lnwi
Let e V M
i ("ij) denote the value of being currently married with match quality
"ij, and EV M
i be the expected continuation value:
e V M
i ("ij) = e UM
i (";￿i (")) + ￿EV M
i
Part of the gain from being married is that in the future, married people have the
option of staying together. This happens with probability ￿M:If they separate,
then either they remarry, with probability ￿M , or they remain single. The



































i is the value of being single in the future, which is independent of
the current match quality.
31The value of being currently single is that one gets a ￿ ow utility plus a














i = KS + (1 + ￿)lnY s ￿ ￿ lnwi + ￿ lnqi
Thus the gains from being married this period are
e V M
i ("ij) ￿ V S
i = e UM












































































i (";￿i (")) ￿ US
i
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿M)￿M
#
Substituting this into the previous expression gives the result.
Lemma 3 Person i will prefer being married if and only if he is awarded a
























￿ ln"j"ij > "M￿￿￿￿(1￿￿
M)￿
M
Proof. Use the de￿nition of e UM
i to solve for the per-period gain from marriage
of person i :
e UM
i (";￿i (")) ￿ US
i = KM + (1 + ￿)lnY m ￿ ￿ lnwi + ￿ ln￿i (")
+￿ ln" ￿ KS ￿ (1 + ￿)lnY s + ￿ lnwi ￿ ￿ lnqi
= ln￿ + (1 + ￿)ln
Y m
Y s + ￿ ln￿i (") + ￿ ln" ￿ ￿ lnqi
) E e UM
i (";￿i (")) ￿ US
i = ￿ln￿ + (1 + ￿)ln
Y m
Y s
￿￿ lnqi + ￿E
￿
ln￿i (") + ￿ ln"j"ij > "M￿










1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿M)￿M
￿




￿ ￿ lnqi + ￿E
￿
ln￿i (") + ￿ ln"j"ij > "M￿
￿
= ￿ ln￿i (") + ￿ ln" +
ln￿ + (1 + ￿)ln Y
m
Y s
i ￿ ￿ lnqi






1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿M)￿M E
￿
ln￿i (") + ￿ ln"j"ij > "M￿
If ￿i (") is independent of " then we have that ￿ must be the same in the future
as now.
Wi (") = ￿ ln"ij +
￿ ln￿i (") + ln￿ + (1 + ￿)ln Y
m
Y s
i ￿ ￿ lnqi




















+ ln￿ + (1 + ￿)ln Y
m
Y s ￿ ￿ lnqi


























￿ ln"j"ij > "M￿￿
The result follows directly from this expression.
Lemma 4 Suppose that in the future marriages will take place if and only " >
"M:Then for a matched pair with match quality ", marriage in the current period
is the e¢ cient outcome if and only if " > "￿ ￿
"M￿
:This marriage threshold is a





















































































Proposition 5 There is a unique equilibrium marriage rate ￿M in the marriage
economy.
Consider the case where ￿M > 1=2:Since ￿M ￿
"M￿
is declining in "M, and
since for ￿M > 1=2 , a
￿
"M￿
is declining in ￿M ￿
"M￿
, then a0 ￿
"M￿
> 0: To
get ￿M > 1=2 requires that "M < "=2: So the RHS is decreasing in "M for
all "M < "=2: For "M > "=2, a0 ￿
"M￿
< 0; therefore the LHS may continue to
decline but is eventually increasing in "M, as the exponential term dominates.
By assumption, "￿ (0) > 0 and "￿ (") < ", so there is a unique ￿xed point to the
mapping "￿ ￿
"M￿
:11 The marriage rate is given by
￿M = 1 ￿ F ("￿ ("￿))
A.3 Determination of the Pareto Weights
Proposition 6 Under the egalitarian solution, the Pareto weight of spouse j





1 + e qe y
1+￿
￿
Proof. The solution equates the gains from marriage:




11The ￿rst assumption means that even if people stay married for sure in the future, there
are some matches that will not result in marriage. The second says that even if everyone
divorces for sure in the future, there will be some marriages today.
34Given the expression (5) for Wi ("), this implies
￿ ln￿i ￿ (1 + ￿)lnY s
i ￿ ￿ lnqi
= ￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ (1 + ￿)lnY s















































The result follows by symmetry.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the bargaining solution is the Nash solution. Then
the Pareto weight solves:
Wi (￿i)




Proof. The Nash solution maximizes the product of the gains from marriage:
Wi (￿i)Wj (1 ￿ ￿i)
Assuming an interior solution, the following holds at the optimum:
W0
i (￿i)Wj (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ Wi (￿i)W0
j (1 ￿ ￿i) = 0
Rearranging gives
Wi (￿i)





j (1 ￿ ￿i)
Since ￿ appears in the gains as ￿ ln￿ then the derivatives are ￿=￿, which gives
the result.
Note that in the Nash solution, marriage prospects will a⁄ect the Pareto
weights, because the term ￿ME
￿
ln"j"ij > "M￿
does not drop out as it does in














35A.4 Married-couple￿ s expenditure share
For the calibration exercise in Section 6, it was essential to compute the share
of household wealth devoted to home appliances. This ensures that the model
does not rely on an unrealistically important role of such goods in determining
the allocation of household time. In this section we explain how we computed
the empirical measure of this variable.
The data was drawn from the 1972-73 summary data set of the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. All variables in this data set are recorded on an annual
basis, unlike the raw CES, which lists expenditures by quarter and income by
year. The sample was all married households where the age of the wife was
between 25 and 55 and for whom the sum of the labor incomes of the spouses
was positive. The measure of spending on home appliances was the sum of two
categories in the data: Major Appliances and Minor Appliances. The average
ratio of this to labor income was 0.0156. This is the value we use as a calibration
target.
There are a number of serious quantitative issues involved in setting this
target. First, we know that total expenditures in the CES are much lower than
the total from NIPA data. In the course of the 1980s, Cordoba (1996) shows that
this category is 60 per cent lower in the Consumer Expenditure Survey than in
the NIPA. Second we don￿ t know to what extent the CES variable corresponds
to home appliances as de￿ned in the production function of home goods. Jones,
Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) argue for a broader interpretation that includes
motor vehicles and housing. Also, in our model consumption equals market
income but in the data, due to taxes and savings, consumption is considerably
less. All of these would suggest the calibration target should be considerably
higher. For instance the NIPA data show that Equipment and Furniture average
about 5% of personal consumption over this period.
On the other hand, in the1970s, husbands worked about 45% of their time
endowment and wives 12%. Yet in the calibration we divide by full income
instead of actual labor income. This means we should be using a lower target.
However the results are quite robust to fairly large changes in this target, as
the calibration procedure easily adjusts the parameters in response to a change
of target. The main point is to force the model to cleave to a target that is the
right order of magnitude, which this appears to be.
36Figure 1: Working hours for married couples where wife is 25-34 years old or
35-44
37Figure 2: Weekly working hours for married couples in PSID, where wife is
25-34 or 35-44 years old and works at least 25 hours weekly,1970-1997
38Figure 3: Hours of work of unmarried household heads in PSID, ages 30-44 and
45-54
39Figure 4: How the minimum q ratio for husbands leisure to fall depends on
wages and the exponent "a" in condition (4)































Figure 5: The NIPA price index for furniture and household equipment, ex-
pressed as a ratio to the GDP de￿ ator.
41